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I Introduction
It is well known that cross-listing of domestic stocks in foreign exchanges has significant valuation effects. The finance literature identifies a number of sources of cross-listing valuation benefits that we can group into two broad categories: the benefits that arise purely from trading in a foreign market, and those associated with a reduction in asymmetric information. The benefits in the first category, called the conventional wisdom by Karolyi (2006) , include broadening the investors' base (Merton (1987) , Foerster and Karolyi (1999) ), reducing market segmentation (Domowitz, Glenn, and Madhavan (1997) and Miller (1999) ), and increasing liquidity associated with multi-market trading (Domowitz, Glenn, and Madhavan (1998) , Foerster and Karolyi (1999) ). The second category of cross-listing benefits are those that arise from the reduction of asymmetric information. 1 Broadly speaking, two different strands of literature fall in this category. First, the bonding hypothesisproposed by Doidge et al. (2004) , and based on the work of Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 , Stulz (1999) and Reese and Weisbach (2002) -posits that the increased disclosure and legal obligations associated with cross-listing on a U.S. exchange enhance investor protection and, consequently, reduce the agency costs of controlling shareholders. Second, the signaling hypothesis, based on the theoretical contributions of Cantale (1996) , Fuerst (1998) , and Moel (1999) , states that companies choose to cross-list their shares on exchanges with more compelling disclosure requirements to "communicate" their higher quality to the market 2 .
Previous studies that examine cross-listing do not provide conclusive evidence as to the relative importance and magnitude of the different sources of value. This limitation stems from the simultaneous positive valuation impact on the listed shares of all the cross-listing explanations. Early studies focused almost exclusively on the effects of market segmentation and liquidity. 3 Studies in-1 See Lang et al. (2003) and more recently, Bailey et al. (2006) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) for the relation between cross-listing and the information environment of the firm. Also, see Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) for the resolution of asymmetric information and competition among exchanges.
2 Note that liquidity is also related to the amount of information asymmetry. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) characterize an economy where the market maker sets a bid-ask spread depending on the level of asymmetric information. That is, we can attribute part of the liquidity increase associated with cross-listing (documented in previous studies) to a decrease in information asymmetry.
vestigating the bonding benefits of cross-listing identify a number of difficulties associated with the market segmentation explanation, given the extensive liberalization of world capital markets and the time series pattern of cross-listings (see Stulz (1999) , Doidge (2004) , Doidge et al. (2004) , and Karolyi (2006)). However, more recent studies that attempt to disentangle the different sources of cross-listing benefits produce contradicting results, leaving the issue far from being settled. Bris et al. (2007) find evidence that the economic significance of the bonding benefits is small relative to that of market segmentation and liquidity. Gozzi et al. (2008) also find evidence in support of segmentation benefits over bonding benefits. Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) find little evidence of a permanent effect on returns for firms listing in markets that are more liquid, that provide better legal protection, or that have a large shareholder base. They do find, however, some evidence that supports the argument of greater information disclosure providing a permanent reduction in returns. King and Segal (2009) find evidence that investor recognition and firm-level bonding are distinct, but related effects. And, finally, Doidge et al. (2009) find that exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms that a London listing cannot replicate.
The objective of this paper is to provide an alternative test of both the "conventional wisdom" sources of cross-listing benefits and the new information-based theories. To achieve this goal, we exploit a feature of the organizational structure of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which allows us to isolate the effects of information-based explanations as well as the multi-market trading benefits.
Up until 2004, companies with countries of incorporation outside the U.K. could be exchanged in the overseas segment of the LSE under two different programs: official listing and admission to trading.
The first program, an official listing on the LSE, is initiated by the firm's decision to list its shares in the U.K. The second program, unique to the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation International market (SEAQ-I), is started by a market maker/dealer without the firm's involvement. This difference allows us to conduct a clean test of the various theories behind the valuation effects documented in the cross-listing literature. On the one hand, the benefits associated with cross-border trading on SEAQ-I can solely be attributed to multi-market trading (i.e. a reduction of market segmentation and an increase in liquidity). In fact, the company does not participate in the admission process; thus, we cannot conceivably attribute the value that the process creates to the reduction of informational asymmetries (as posed by the information-based explanations). On the other hand, the stock price the information based explanations, to the extend that disclosure requirements, listing requirements, and the investor protection of the domestic emerging markets are of lower quality relative to those of developed markets.
reaction that accompanies the listing decision on the LSE can be generated by the potential benefits of a decrease in market segmentation, an increase in liquidity, as well as by the reduction in information asymmetry associated with adhering to the LSE's strict disclosure requirements and monitoring. The dichotomy between companies that list on the LSE after a strategic and voluntary corporate decision and companies that just "trade" on SEAQ-I (without their involvement) provides a unique framework for testing the information-based explanations, while effectively controlling for liquidity and for the removal of investment barriers.
We proceed to empirically investigate the effects of both cross-listing on LSE and trading on SEAQ-I on abnormal returns and price volatility in the home market. Our findings are consistent with the positive valuation effects suggested by the information-based motives for cross-listing. An event study analysis documents significantly positive abnormal returns around the cross-listing event, and no significant price reaction around the trading event. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the difference in abnormal returns between the two events persists after we control for selection bias and a number of firm, home country, and cross-country characteristics. We also document that firms that use higher quality accounting standards (either U.S. GAAP or International Accounting Standards) prior to listing, experience lower abnormal returns because they already operate in an enhanced disclosure environment. Furthermore, the significantly higher abnormal returns enjoyed by cross-listed firms persist even after we control for firms with cross-listings in other markets prior to their London listing/trading and for firms that raise capital up to three years after cross-listing.
Finally, a price volatility analysis provides additional support that market microstructure frictions and differences in the liquidity effects of LSE cross-listing relative to SEAQ-I trading cannot explain the documented differences in abnormal returns. We find no evidence of an increase in the liquidity of the domestic shares for listed firms relative to SEAQ-I traded firms.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, our results contribute to the extensive literature that examines the impact of cross-listing on firm value, and our unique sample allows us to factor out the incremental value of the information-based explanations of cross listing benefits. Second, our paper contributes to the recent literature on the effect of cross-listing outside the U.S. and, in particular, on the LSE 4 . Third, the use of SEAQ-I traded firms offers an alternative approach to alleviate the endogeneity problem associated with cross-listing. In fact, any analysis of the valuation effects of cross-listings suffers a severe self-selection problem. Possible remedies include an econometric approach of modelling the firm's decision choice (Heckman (1979) ), or the use of an appropriate control sample. Some authors have circumvented the endogeneity problem by considering a sample of firms with dual-class shares that list either one or both of the classes (Doidge (2004) and Bris et al. (2007) ).
Ideally, however, one would like to have a sample of firms that could, but do not list abroad, or alternatively, a sample of firms that cross-list, but do not want to, or do not choose to. The latter sample is given by SEAQ-I firms. In addition to this unique property of our sample we show that our results are robust to a Heckman (1979) correction for selection bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present an introduction to the LSE and more importantly, to the SEAQ-I admission process. Section III discusses our sample selection process and the variables used in our study. It also provides summary statistics and a univariate comparison of the firm and country level characteristics of our sample of listed relative to traded firms. Section IV introduces the analysis and presents a simple univariate event study.
Section V conducts a cross-sectional analysis, describes the methodology used, analyzes the results, and presents a series of robustness tests. Section VI contains the price volatility decomposition analysis. Finally, section VII concludes the paper.
II Listing vs. Trading on the London Stock Exchange
The listing mechanisms in U.S. markets have been described in detail in the literature (see Karolyi exchanges (see Doidge et al. (2008) , Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) , and Schill (2009a and 2009b) ). We explore two distinct paths through which foreign securities could be admitted to the International Markets Section of the LSE: an official U.K. listing in the London Stock Exchange's Main Market (henceforth "listing"), and an admission to trading on SEAQ-I (henceforth "trading").
In this section, we provide an overview of the two markets. The former process is similar to that of U.S. exchange listings in that the firm files an application via the U.K. Listing Authority (UKLA).
In this paper, we define "listed" firms as those that obtain admission through this mechanism. The latter mechanism does not require the firms' involvement and its unique features are explained below.
Throughout this paper, we refer to firms that are exchanged on SEAQ-I as "traded" firms.
The market most people would identify as "the U.K. stock market" is the London Stock Exchange's 4 Main market. A two-stage admission process applies to companies that want to have their securities admitted to this market. First, the securities need to be admitted to the Official List by the United Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA), a division of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and then also admitted to trading by the London Stock Exchange. To be admitted to the LSE's Main market, companies have to abide by a set of strict rules. The Exchange does not get involved in setting the regulation. This task is the responsibility of the FSA, the main regulator in the U.K.. The UKLA retains some discretion so that in special circumstances, the initial requirements can be waived or "tailored" to reflect individual company requirements. After a company is admitted, the UKLA also sets a series of rules that listed companies need to follow. The UKLA actively monitors the compliance with the admission requirements and continuing obligations (the Standards) so that the market continuously maintains its high quality and smooth operation. The Exchange sets the Standards to protect the Exchange's good name, the companies involved in the process, and the investors. The
Exchange takes monitoring and enforcement actions on a timely basis, and the Exchange maintains the right to suspend trading and, in extreme circumstances, to cancel the right of a company's securities to be traded if the company fails to meet the Standards.
In 1985, the LSE started the SEAQ-I, a competing screen-based, quote-driven system for non-U.K.
equities, that operates in a similar manner to the SEAQ for the U.K., and to the NASDAQ for U.S. and the Exchange does not normally contact the Issuers to let them know that they have begun trading 5 See Bertrand and Gresse (1998). For a more comprehensive treatment of the microstructure features of the SEAQ-I with respect to other European markets, and for the competition among these exchanges, see Pagano (1998) . 6 The Issuers are the companies whose stock is admitted to trade. 5 on the platform" 7 . In summary, the key difference between listing on the LSE (or in a U.S. market, including OTC, for this matter) and trading on SEAQ-I is the firm's voluntary decision to cross-list. 8 SEAQ-I stopped operating on September 27, 2004.
III Data
Our objective is to investigate the stock price reaction around the listing/trading day for non-U.K.
firms that list on the LSE or trade on the SEAQ-I. To build our sample, we start with the complete list of international firms (non U.K.) that were either listed on the LSE or traded on SEAQ-I as of Some firms are present in our sample with more than one instrument. 11 For these 74 firms/securities, we use the information of the instrument that started trading first. We are therefore left with 338 firms that had only one instrument traded and 37 firms for which we used the filter illustrated before.
Overall our final sample includes 375 firms. We have price data for 300 of these companies. However, only 192 are solely traded on SEAQ-I (and 108 are both listed on the LSE and traded on SEAQ-I).
We restrict our attention only to those firms that are either solely listed on the LSE and to those [Insert Table 1] Table 1, Panel A shows that the majority of the SEAQ-I sample comes from Japan (85 firms).
Not surprisingly, the LSE reports that in 2000, 56 percent of the total volume traded in SEAQ-I corresponded to Japanese companies. In addition, our sample of SEAQ-I firms includes 24 firms from Hong Kong, 26 from Taiwan, and 15 from India. The sample of LSE-listed firms is more heavily represented by U.S. firms (27 observations), and by firms from Ireland (21 firms). 12 Table 1 , Panel B, reveals that all major industries are represented in our sample, with Industrial Goods and Services and Technology being the top two industries for both the SEAQ-I and LSE samples. Proportionally, Personal and Household Goods, Real Estate, and Utilities are more heavily represented in the SEAQ-I sample.
for firms listing on the LSE.
12 The reader familiar with the literature will notice that the composition of our sample is different from the composition of the sample of other papers that deal with London cross-listed firms (i.e. Salva (2003) and Doidge et al. (2009) ). The differences can be attributed to the different periods covered by each paper, and in the data requirements imposed for the analysis. Doidge et al. (2009) , for example, do not examine stock price reaction and therefore are not constrained by the availability of daily data. However, the most important difference is that we exclude all companies that are both listed on LSE and traded on SEAQ-I. For example, Salva (2003) has in her sample 29 observations from Japan. We end-up having only one LSE cross-listed firm from Japan. However, in our initial sample we have 23 companies from Japan, but 22 of them also trade on the SEAQ-I and are therefore excluded from our analysis.
In the analysis that follows, we employ a number of firm and country level characteristics as controls 13 . The firm level variables include total revenues, total assets, market capitalization, total debt to total assets (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), foreign sales to total sales and sales growth (computed as the firm's average inflation-adjusted sales growth rate for the two years before the listing/trading event). We also use the natural logarithm of volume in the pre-listing period (measured in the window 250 to 51 days before the listing/trading event) as a liquidity proxy. All firm level variables are taken from Datastream and Worldscope. Table 2 reports summary statistics on the firm level variables for the two groups of firms, including t-tests for differences in means and a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis rank test for differences in medians.
[Insert Table 2 ]
Overall, we find that SEAQ-I firms are larger in size than LSE-listed firms (median total revenues, median total assets, and median market capitalization are all significantly larger at the five percent significance level). The average SEAQ-I firm has $8.54 bn in market capitalization, while the average LSE firm has $6.96 bn. While on average 36% of sales of listed firms are foreign, the corresponding number is only 24% for traded firms, and the difference is significant at the one percent level. SEAQ-I-traded firms appear to be less profitable and more leveraged than LSE-listed firms. The mean ROA stands at 6.54% for LSE listed firms relative to 4.28% for SEAQ-I traded firms, while the corresponding values for total debt to total assets are 19.28% and 28.42%, respectively. The differences in both ROA and leverage are highly significant. In summary, the market makers trade on SEAQ-I large, profitable companies that have decided not to cross-list on the LSE. 14 The country level variables include local market capitalization of listed companies as a % of GDP, local market turnover ratio from the revised dataset of Thorsten, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) as well as the Efficiency of the Judicial System country index from La Porta et al. (LLSV) (1998) and the Capital Access Index as defined in Yago et al. (2000) . The value for this index ranges from 0 to 7 (the higher the score, the more easily companies can access capital). Finally, we use three crosscountry variables. First, geographical distance in miles between London and the respective capital of 13 See Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) for an analysis of the characteristics of companies that cross-list abroad.
14 A good example is Toyota, a Japanese firm that, during the sample period, was not listed in the LSE, but was traded on the SEAQ-I platform. each firm's home country. Second, linguistic distance between English and the local language of each firm's home country. Third, cross-trading between the UK and each firm's home country defined as the sum of trade flow from and to the UK devided by home country GDP. 15
IV Initial Evidence: Event Study
In this section, we use an event study methodology to provide some initial evidence on the valuation benefits of cross-listing and trading. More specifically, we calculate the stock price reaction around the day of listing (for firms that list on LSE) and around the first day of trading (for firms that trade on SEAQ-I). As Foerster and Karolyi (1999) note "announcement dates are theoretically more appropriate than listing dates" to measure abnormal price reaction to cross-listing. However, we decided to use the listing dates for two reasons. First, data collection can be a challenge, especially for older issues for which no data or only spurious data may be available (see Foerster and Karolyi (1999) , but also Serra (1999) and Salva (2003) , among others). Additionally, the determination of the announcement date is often problematic and noisy. Announcement of the intention to cross-list can precede the actual listing by more than a year, or announcements may not be followed by actual listings. Second, since firms do not announce their SEAQ-I trading, using the actual listing dates for both listed and traded firms is a more appropriate choice. We acknowledge that in doing so, we might be missing potential listing announcement effects. However, we still expect to document significant valuation effects on the LSE listing date as the uncertainty surrounding the announcement to cross-list is resolved. 16 Therefore, the difference between the stock price reaction on LSE and SEAQ-I on the listing/trading day may potentially underestimate the total valuation difference, thus biasing our test against rejecting the null hypothesis of no valuation difference. Chiswick and Miller (2004) .
Finally, the cross-trading variable is constructed using the bilateral trade flow data from the Correlates of War Project Pollins (2008 and .
Throughout this paper we use the market model to calculate abnormal returns as follows. For every firm (listed or just traded), the following time series regression is estimated using data in the window (-250,-51) days relative to the event date:
where R i M t is the corresponding market index, which is country specific. We then calculate abnormal returns (AR) from the residuals 17 :
Finally, we obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different sub-periods by adding up the corresponding ARs. Figure 1 plots the cumulative abnormal returns for a period of 20 days around the trading and listing events. In the window [-20, +20] , the CAR accruing to firms listed on LSE is 3.81% (t-stat = 1.69), while for firms traded on SEAQ-I the CAR is -0.038% (t-stat = -0.31). The difference between the two coefficients, which represents the incremental returns of the listing decision, is positive (4.19%) and statistically significant at the 10% level (t-stat = 1.71). In the window [-10, +10] days around the event, the CAR for firms traded on SEAQ-I is 0.012% (t-stat = 0.14), while, for the same period, the CAR for firms listed on LSE is 3.80% (t-stat = 2.21). The difference between the two coefficients is positive (3.68%) and is significant at the 5% level (t-stat = 2.13). In the next section of the paper, we use the more conventional window of [-1, +1] to conduct a cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns. For this window, the CARs for listed and traded firms are 1.91% (t-stat = 1.6) and -1.44% (t-stat = -4.92), respectively. Their difference is 3.35% and it is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat 3.86). The negative abnormal returns in the window [-1,+1] for the SEAQ-I firms are preceded by a run-up the week before the trading day. This pattern is consistent with a potential purchasing activity in the domestic market by SEAQ-I market makers to build-up their inventories ahead of the start of trading in London and the return to normal trading activity after that 18 . 17 We also conducted our analysis using market adjusted returns and the results are qualitatively similar.
18 Pagano (1998) 
V Cross-Sectional Analysis and Results
The results presented above ignore both the cross-sectional differences among firms and a set of different country-specific institutional and legal characteristics. To incorporate these elements into the analysis, we run the following cross-sectional model:
where CARs (−1,+1),i are the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i in the interval (-1, +1) days around the event date; LIST is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is listed and zero if the firm is traded; and Z i is our set of firm and country level control variables. At the firm level, these include size, leverage, ROA, liquidity, sales growth, foreign sales to total sales and prior listing. Prior listing takes the value of one if a firm was already cross-listed in another market prior to its London trading/listing, and zero otherwise. The findings in Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) imply that firms with prior cross-listings in other foreign markets may enjoy lower benefits from their 
where, LIST i is defined after equation (3), W i is a set of variables that affect the listing decision, η i is the error term, and Φ() is the normal distribution function. The corrected second stage valuation equation then becomes:
where LIST i and Z i are defined after equation (3), λ i is the inverse Mills ratio, and v i is the error term. Belgium. We further augmented this information using the dataset of Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) .
A Empirical Results
cross-list than cross-trade in London. Finally, cross-listed and traded firms do not appear to differ significantly in term of leverage and sales growth.
[Insert Table 3 ] it avoids imposing undue burden on the sample size by excluding variables that are never statistically significant and have a substantial number of missing observations. 20 Models 1 and 6 include firm level variables and control for country fixed effects, while models 2 through 4 and 7 through 9 sequentially introduce country and cross-country variables as controls instead of country fixed effects. Because, of the substantial number of missing values in the foreign sales to total sales and cross-trading variables we only include them in the full versions of the model (5 and 10) for completeness. All models are estimated using year and industry fixed effects.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Our main focus is on the coefficient estimate of the LIST dummy variable, which measures the incremental cumulative abnormal return for firms that list on the LSE, relative to firms that trade on the SEAQ-I platform. Across all models, the coefficient estimates are always positive and statistically significant at least at the 10% level. They are also economically significant, ranging from 2.22% in model 4 to 4.55% in model 5 for the robust OLS estimation and from 2.22% in model 6 to 4.58% in model 10 of the Heckman estimation. We must note that both economic and statistical significance are maintained even after we include in the model all of our variables measuring firm, home country, and cross-country characteristics and after controlling for selection bias. These results reconfirm the findings in the univariate event study tests, and reinforce our claim that significant valuation benefits arise from the reduction of information asymmetry when companies cross-list on LSE.
The constant in our model captures the cumulative abnormal returns for the firms trading on SEAQ-I. The figure is typically positive, but is statistically significant at the 10% level only in models 4 and 8. These results indicate that the potential benefits of market integration arising from pure 20 We also estimate all versions of the model in Table 4 using model 5 of Table 3 as the first stage probit model in the Heckman estimation and the qualitative results do not change.
13 multi-market trading are limited, in line with the conjecture in Doidge et al. (2004) and Karolyi (2006) that the market integration explanation is not consistent with the time series patterns of cross-listing.
An examination of the coefficient estimates for the control variables is also instructive. In almost all models, size and sales growth exhibit positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates, while the coefficient estimates of LnVolume and ROA are negative and statistically significant. These suggest that larger firms and firms with high growth opportunities benefit more from their London presence, while more profitable and more liquid firms benefit less. 21 The coefficient estimate on the efficiency of the judicial system is negative and statistically significant in models 2 and 7, but it becomes insignificant when aditional country variables are included in the model. Our results suggest that London cross-listed firms do not appear to enjoy the legal benefits implied by the bonding hypothesis, consistent with the findings of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009) and Lel and Miller (2008) . 22 The variable market capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP is always positive and significant indicating that firms from large capital markets benefit more from their crosslisting/trading. The variables leverage, prior listing, market turnover ratio, foreign sales, and all cross-country variables are not statistically significant in any version of the model. Finally, the coefficient estimate on the inverse Mills ratio is positive and statistically significant, at least at the 10% level, in all five Heckman models. The significance of the inverse Mills ratio is indicative of the adequacy of the endogeneity correction. 23 Overall, the particular dichotomy between firms that seek and obtain listing on the LSE and firms that merely trade on the SEAQ-I platform (without their involvement) allows us to capture the valuation effect of the information component. We document significant incremental valuation benefits for LSE cross-listed firms relative to SEAQ-I firms. We also provide evidence that shows 21 We also use the percentage of zero returns as a proxy of liquidity (Bekaert et al. (2007) ). Furthermore, to control for possible asymmetric liquidity effects across local exchanges, we use the change in the percentage of zero returns around the listing/trading event. Controlling for these variables in models 4, 5, 9 and 10 instead of Ln(Volume) does not change our qualitative results. 22 We do not attempt to formally distinguish between the different information-based explanations of cross-listing (signaling and bonding). However, the aforementioned findings suggest that the information-based benefits documented in this paper can, perhaps, be attributed to the disclosure enhancement of an LSE listing and not to an enhancement of the firm's legal environment. We explore this further in the next section by controlling for the firm level information environment prior to cross-listing/trading. 23 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us in this direction.
that differences in market integration and in liquidity between the listed and the traded firms cannot explain the differential benefits associated with listing and trading, and therefore, we conclude that they are associated with the reduction of information asymmetry present in LSE cross-listing, but not in SEAQ-I trading. In the remainder of the paper, we proceed to conduct additional tests to reinforce these findings.
B Additional Robustness Tests
In this section, we investigate whether firms that use higher quality accounting standards (U.S. GAAP, or International Accounting Standards (IAS)) enjoy lower valuation benefits. We also examine whether firms that raise capital after their cross-listing, experience higher valuation benefits. Different theories of cross-listing suggest that the valuation impact of cross-listing could vary, based on the information environment of the firm prior to cross-listing (Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003)), and possible equity raising activity (Reese and Weisbah (2002) ). Firms with higher quality accounting standards will potentially benefit less from cross-listing, while firms that raise equity are more likely to benefit more.
In order to capture these effects in our model and to be able to capture the marginal effect on the traded stocks, we create three additional dummy variables. First, TRADE takes the value of one if a firm is traded on SEAQ-I, and zero otherwise; second, Accounting Standards takes the value of one if a firm uses IAS or U.S. GAAP prior to its cross-listing/trading, and zero otherwise; and finally, Equity takes the value of one if a firm raises capital up to three years following cross-listing on LSE, and zero otherwise. All models include as controls the variables used in models 4 and 5 of Table 4 .
Each model is estimated using both robust OLS and the Heckman (1979) correction for selection bias.
Model 4 of Table 3 is used as the first stage selection equation in all Heckman (1979) models.
[Insert Table 5 ] Table 5 presents the results. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 test for differential abnormal returns for firms with enhanced disclosure standards prior to their cross-listing/trading. According to the informationbased explanations of cross-listing, we expect that these firms enjoy lower abnormal returns when cross-listed on the LSE because they already operate in a higher quality information environment. 24
The coefficient estimate of the interaction of the LIST variable with the Accounting Standards dummy 15 is negative in all four models ranging from -0.9% to -1.6%, but it is statistically significant at the 10% level only in model 1. This result is consistent with the explanation that firms coming from a higher quality information environment benefit less from cross-listing. The coefficient estimates of the interaction of Accounting standards with the TRADE dummy variable are negative, but not significant, indicating that the prior firm information environment does not affect the valuation of SEAQ-I traded firms. Finally, in models 3, 4, 7, and 8, the coefficient estimates of the interaction of the LIST variable with the Equity dummy variable are positive, and statistically significant at the 10% level. More importantly, in all models of Table 5 , the coefficient estimate on the LIST dummy variable remains positive as well as statistically and economically significant. These results show that even after we account for a potential differential valuation effect for firms with higher quality information environments, and firms that raise capital after their cross-listing, the valuation benefits of cross-listed firms relative to traded firms remain significantly higher. 25
VI Price Volatility Analysis
In this section, we investigate in more depth whether the documented differences in abnormal returns between the LSE listed firms and the SEAQ-I firms are driven by differential liquidity effects due to microstructure differences between the two trading platforms. Halling et al (2007) examining the trading volume patterns of foreign firms listing in the United States find that overall domestic market activity does not suffer from cross-listing. On the contrary, they find that both around the crosslisting date and in subsequent years, the domestic turnover ratio increases significantly. However they document also that this finding is strong for firms from developed countries but not for firms from emerging markets. Pagano and Roell (1991) document that for several Italian stocks the inception of SEAQ-I trading increased trading volume on the Milan Stock Exchange. In a similar study of Belgian cross-listed stocks, Anderson and Tychon (1993) conclude that London trading on balance has stimulated greater trading in Brussels. It is therefore possible that the trading/listing events can result in differential effects on the domestic trading activity and thus have a differential impact on home market liquidity which could explain the differential valuation effects we documented in our previous analysis. To investigate this possibility, we estimate the effects of listing/trading on the sensitivity of price to trading volume in the domestic market. We conduct a price volatility analysis using a modified version of the econometric model of Domowitz et al. (1998) . The econometric model is given below:
where:
and P t is daily price (in U.K. pounds), (∆P t ) 2 = (P t − P t−1 ) 2 , (∆P t−1 ) 2 = (P t−1 − P t−2 ) 2 , and V t is volume measured as the number of shares traded per day (in millions) in the domestic market. AFTER is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the observation is following the trading/listing event, and zero otherwise, and the other dummy variables are explained in Tables 4 and 5 . The time-varying parameters of the model are estimated using panel data methodologies.
The theoretical model in Domowitz et al (1998) decomposes price volatility into two components.
The first component captures the variance of overnight public information that arises from imperfect public information. This term, which represents base level volatility, is captured in the econometric model by the parameter γ t . The second component represents the volatility induced by microstructure frictions, including information asymmetry. This component is proportional to expected daily volume, where the proportionality coefficient λ is inversely related to market liquidity. This is captured by the parameter λ t in our econometric estimation, which measures the responsiveness of price to trading volume. In the empirical estimation of their model, Domowitz et al (1998) also control for (∆P t−1 ) 2 as they argue that it is economically plausible that fundamental (or base level) volatility may be related to price movements on the previous day. Accordingly, we also control for price changes the previous day by including (∆P t−1 ) 2 in our econometric model 6. Finally, we allow the coefficient estimates of model 6 to change over time as indicated in equations 7-9 in order to capture the effects of listing/trading initiation. We are particularly interested in the effects of listing/trading on λ t .
[Insert Table 6 ] Table 6 presents the results. The model is estimated separately with year and firm fixed effects.
We also estimate the model for the whole sample and separately for firms from developed and emerging markets. The parameters γ 0 and λ 0 are typically positive and significant 26 , confirming the validity of the model (see Domowitz et al. (1998) ). With respect to liquidity, the parameters of interest are λ 2 and λ 3 . They measure the effect of cross-listing on the sensitivity of price volatility to trading volume for LSE and SEAQ-I, respectively. The estimated parameters can be affected by market microstructure frictions, including order flow migration and order processing costs. Interestingly, we find that the listing and trading events in the overall and developed market samples do not affect the liquidity in the domestic market, as the estimated coefficients λ 2 and λ 3 are not statistically different from zero. For emerging market firms, we find negative and significant coefficients λ 2 and λ 3 in the two models without firm fixed effects, but no significant effects when firm fixed effects are included in the model. The significant improvement in liquidity implied by these negative coefficients appears to be stronger for traded firms relative to listed firms. These results support the argument that microstructure frictions and thus, possible differences in the liquidity effects of cross-listing relative to SEAQ-I trading, cannot explain the documented differences in abnormal returns. We find no evidence of an increase in domestic market liquidity for the listed firms relative to the SEAQ-I traded firms. In fact, on the contrary, for firms from emerging markets, the documented significant increase in liquidity appears to be stronger for traded firms relative to listed firms.
VII Conclusions
We exploit a unique feature of the organizational structure of the London Stock Exchange that allows for direct tests of the market segmentation and liquidity hypotheses against the information-based hypotheses of cross-listing. Up until 2004, foreign firms could be exchanged in the Overseas Segment of the LSE under two distinct programs: admission to trading and official listing. The first is initiated by a market maker/dealer without the firm's involvement. The second commences with the firm's strategic decision to cross-list on the LSE and abide by its disclosure and monitoring requirements.
26 The coefficient estimates are always positive and significant in the overall sample, but become insignificant in some models in the developed or the emerging markets sub-samples. They are never significantly negative.
We document empirical evidence in support of significant information-driven valuation benefits and limited support for the effects of market segmentation and liquidity.
An event study around the listing/trading dates documents positive and significant valuation effects for cross-listed firms and positive, but statistically insignificant, valuation effects for SEAQ-I traded firms. A cross-sectional analysis of the abnormal returns shows that the documented significant incremental valuation benefit of cross-listing on LSE relative to trading on SEAQ-I is robust to a series of controls for various firm, country, and cross-country characteristics. These include size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth opportunities, foreign sales, firm-level information environment, prior cross-listings in other markets, capital raising, home country level investor protection and financial development, as well as cross-country variables for geographical distance, linguistic distance, and crosstrading. Our findings are also robust to a Heckman (1979) correction for selection bias. Furthermore, the price volatility analysis provides conclusive support that the differences in the liquidity effects of LSE cross-listing relative to SEAQ-I trading cannot explain the documented differences in abnormal returns. In fact, we find no evidence of an increase in domestic market liquidity for the listed firms relative to the SEAQ-I traded firms. In the regressions, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of one when the firm is listed (LSE) and zero when the firm is traded (SEAQ-I). The table reports the marginal effect of a change in the independent variable on the probability of an LSE listing. Accounting Variables are from Worldscope, and they are all winsorized at the 5% probability level to avoid outliers. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of Total Assets (in thousands); Leverage is the Total Debt to Total Assets ratio; ROA is the Return on Assets; Ln Volume is the natural logarithm of volume in the prelisting/trading period; Growth in Sales and Foreign Sales to Total Sales are from Worldscope; Prior Listing takes the value of 1 if a SEAQ-I traded/LSE listed firm has a prior cross-listing on another foreign exchange and zero otherwise; Capital Access is the index defined in Yago et al. (2000) ; Efficiency of the Judicial System Index is from LLSV (1998); Market capitalization (% of GDP) and Market turnover ratio (%) are from the revised dataset of Thorsten, DemirgucKunt, and Levine (2000); Linguistic distance, Ln Mile Distance, and Cross-trading are cross-country variables defined in the text. Our sample spans the period 1980-2004. All models are estimated with industry fixed effects. Robust z statistics are in brackets. Asterisks denote significance level: one asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, two asterisks denote significance at the 5% level, and three asterisks denote significance at the 1% level. and V t is the daily volume. We interact the coefficients , , and , with dummy variables that take value 1 when the stock is Listed (subscript 1); when the stock is Listed, after the Listing date (subscript 2); when the stock is Traded, after the trading date (subscript 3). See equations 6-9 in the text of the paper for more details. The model is estimated with 250 observations before, and 250 observations after the listing (trading date). Our listing/trading events span the period 1980 -2004 . Robust Newey-West (1987 t-statistics are noted below each coefficient. Asterisks denote significance level: one asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, two asterisks denote significance at the 5% level, and three asterisks denote significance at the 1% level. 
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